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ABSTRACT
This doctoral dissertation provides new theoretical and empirical analysis on em-
ployer learning and its impact on employees’ incentive provisions within organizations.
In the first chapter, we show with 20 years of personnel data from a large U.S.
firm, that employee performance displays a unique pattern that cannot be explained
by human capital or incentive theories under the classical principal-agent framework.
To explain the observed pattern, we propose an enriched principal-manager-employee
framework that captures real life complications such as favoritism and influence ac-
tivities. We show that supervisors are disciplined to give less biased subjective evalu-
ations under promotion-based incentive schemes compared to bonus-based incentive
schemes and the costs of wasteful influence activities could constrain the firm’s ability
to optimize employees effort in a way that generates equilibrium performance patterns
we observe in the data.
In the second chapter, we study the credibility of the firing threat, which is widely
used as a disciplinary device in the workplace. Despite its prevalence, theoretical
foundations on the credibility of firing threats are not well studied. When firing is
costly to the employer, it is not credible to carry out a firing threat unless a decrease
v
in expected future return is associated with the employees misbehavior. We explore
the role of learning in ensuring the credibility of firing threats and how a certain level
of uncertainty is necessary to effectively induce compliance. Peter Principle arises as
an outcome of the model, as workers who are known to be competent almost certainly
can no longer be disciplined and need to be promoted to more difficult tasks, even
though they may be less productive at those tasks.
In the third chapter, we propose a new method to test asymmetric learning in a
multi-period framework and derive testable implications based on easily observable
dynamic wage patterns. We test our model predictions using the NLSY97 data. The
empirical results are consistent with symmetric learning and show no evidence of
asymmetric learning.
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1Chapter 1
Favoritism, Influence and Employee
Incentives in Large Organizations
1.1 Introduction
Optimal incentive provision is an essential aspect of firm management. Despite the
abundance of economic studies on this topic, most previous studies focus on the de-
sign of incentive contracts when worker outputs are easily observed and measured.
Although contracts and performances of CEOs and mutual fund managers shed im-
portant light on how incentives operate, most people do not work in positions like
this. Compared to the large body of literature on managers, the incentives and per-
formances of ordinary employees, especially those in white collar positions with hard
to measure output, receive relatively little attention. In this chapter, we look into the
performances of ordinary white-collar employees in large organizations and discuss
the optimal design of their incentives under real-life complications of favoritism and
influence activities.
With 20 years of personnel data from a large U.S. firm in the financial industry, we
find that performance ratings of employees at the studied firm display a unique non-
monotonic pattern. Firstly, with fixed effect panel data analysis, there is a significant
negative correlation between performance ratings and position specific tenure. That
is, as an employee stays in one position for longer, his performance rating scores de-
crease. Secondly, the level of position has a significant positive effect on performance
2ratings. That is, an employee’s performance rating increases when he is promoted
to a higher level. The general pattern of performance ratings of an employee who
has moved through several job levels in the firm is thus non-monotonic. Performance
gradually decreases as an employee stays in the same position, but jumps back up
when he is promoted to a higher level. This pattern of performance ratings decreasing
with position-specific tenure and jumping back up with promotion to a higher level
is worth noting because it is incompatible with human capital theories. Intuitively,
as an employee stays in one position longer, he should have gained more experience
and skills for that position, making him able to perform better. Upon promotion to a
higher level, facing new tasks that he may not be familiar with, the employee should
be less likely to perform well. However, our data suggest the exact opposite of what
human capital theories predict.
Before our study, the negative relationship between performance and general firm
tenure has been reported in several previous studies. With personnel data from three
different firms, Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) first showed that there was a neg-
ative relationship between within level performance ratings and employees’ tenure
at the firm. This negative relationship was later confirmed in several other studies
with different data sets, including Bakers, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994), Flabbi and
Ichino (2001) and Gibbs and Hendricks (2004). Despite the consistent evidence of
the negative relationship between performance rating scores and tenure, little discus-
sion is made on why performance would fall with tenure. The main reason is that
there exist plausible alternative explanations of these empirical results other than
that performance indeed decreases with tenure. For cross-sectional results, the se-
lection effect of better performers being promoted out of the position alone could
explain the negative relationship. However, the selection effect could not explain the
still existing negative effect in longitudinal results, when decreasing performance is
3observed for the same set of employees. Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Gibbons
and Waldman (1999) suggest that supervisors may evaluate individuals relative to
others with similar experience and that rating scores reflect believed innate ability
rather than absolute performance. With relative performance ratings and on-the-job
learning, slow learners would stay in the same position for longer and also experience
gradual decreases in performance ratings, as they are gradually learned to be of low
ability or fall further behind their peers.
Our empirical analysis adds on to this line of research, firstly, by showing that
position-specific tenure is the main driving force of the general negative relationship
between performance and tenure. Secondly, we provide additional empirical analysis
addressing alternative explanations, making a stronger case that performance indeed
decreases with tenure. In particular, with the relative performance rating explanation,
only employees with below average innate ability should receive decreasing ratings
with tenure. For those who are of higher than average ability, additional years in
the position should reveal that they are better than others and increase their ratings.
We, therefore, separated employees into different ability groups based on how fast
they are promoted and we show that the negative relationship persists regardless of
employees’ ability group.
With multiple studies showing the evidence of the general negative relationship
between performance ratings and tenure, and our analysis that such a negative re-
lationship cannot be explained by previously believed alternative explanations, we
believe it is worth considering that decreasing employee performance with tenure may
be a real phenomenon and discussing why it happens, especially with position-specific
tenure.
Possible theories related to decreasing performance with tenure include the de-
ferred compensation theory in Lazear (1979, 1981) and the career concerns theory
4in Holmstrom (1982, 1999). In the deferred compensation theory, the deferred com-
pensation and the possibility of losing it act as an incentive device. As the amount
of deferred compensation decreases when employees approach retirement, their per-
formance could fall due to reduced incentives. This theory could potentially explain
the decrease of performance with tenure; however, it could not explain why perfor-
mance falls with position-specific tenure, which in fact is the main driving force of the
general decrease in our empirical results. Another possible theory could explain the
fall with position-specific tenure by applying the underlying mechanism of the career
concerns, which was originally formulated for managers, to ordinary employees. If
supervisors learn about employees’ ability and make decisions such as promotions
based on their belief about employees’ ability, the same falling of implicit incentives
could happen with ordinary employees within organizations as well. If the learning
restarts as employees change positions, the falling incentives would be associated with
position-specific tenure.
Although the falling implicit incentives from promotion concerns seems like a plau-
sible story, we would like to argue that this story alone cannot satisfactorily explain
the decreasing performance we observe in the data. The reason is that promotion
is only one of the many devices that firms could use to motivate employees. In
a follow-up study of Holmstrom (1982), Gibbons and Murphy (1991) show that a
firm’s optimal incentive scheme should optimize the overall incentives and neutralize
decreasing career concerns with increasing explicit incentives. They also find support
for that with data on CEO compensations. Gibbons and Murphy’s result explains
why, despite the decreasing career concerns, we do not observe a negative correlation
between CEO performance and tenure. If we believe that, similar to the optimization
of incentives for CEOs, firms also optimize the total incentives for ordinary employ-
ees, it is then less clear why the decreasing implicit incentives alone would result in
5the decreasing equilibrium performance which we are able to observe in the data. We
then move forward to explore what might be special about the incentive provision
of ordinary employees such that their performances fall with tenure, even when the
optimal combination of explicit and implicit incentives is deployed.
One special aspect of the incentive provision for ordinary white-collar employees
is that, most of the time, their output cannot be easily measured, and assessments of
their performance often depend on manager’s subjective evaluations. The subjective
evaluation by managers, who are self-interested agents themselves in large organiza-
tions, adds another layer to the usual principal-agent framework for the analysis of the
incentive provision of ordinary employees in large organizations. Managers, as human
beings with personal likes and dislikes, are not invulnerable to personal favoritism and
influence activities as discussed in Prendergast and Topel (1996) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1988). The fact that managers may derive private benefit from rewarding
their favored employees opens up the possibility that subjective evaluations are dis-
torted by favoritism, and such favoritism furthermore induces employees to engage
in interpersonal influence activities to gain the manager’s favor. Such complications
not only introduce additional influence cost for incentive provisions but also affect
the firm’s choice of different incentive instruments.
In our theoretical analysis, we propose an enriched principal-manager-employee
framework to study the optimal incentive provision for ordinary employees under
real-life complications such as favoritism and influence. Our model is different from
the usual principal-agent framework in that, instead of assuming that the setting of
incentive schemes, monitoring of employees and the execution of incentive schemes
are all done by the principal, we assume the monitoring and execution are delegated
to managers. Furthermore, managers are not always impartial. They derive private
benefit from exercising their own preferences over employees and must be disciplined
6away from doing so.
One important result arising from the possible existence of manager’s favoritism
is that certain incentive instruments are less prone to the problem of favoritism than
others, and would be preferred by the firm. In particular, the difference lies in whether
the reward for performance has only distributional consequences or would have a
direct impact on the firm’s future output. To illustrate the point, take for example
a tournament with monetary bonuses vs. promotion as the reward. For now, let us
move away from relational contracts and long-term reputations and consider a two-
period case. When the reward is monetary, who wins the reward in the first period
has no direct consequence on the production in the second period. On the other
hand, if the reward is promotion, it matters whether those who win are those who
would be most productive at the higher level. If better performance is associated with
better suitability for promotion and manager’s compensations are tied to the firm’s
output, using promotion as the incentive instrument would give managers the implicit
incentive to reward those who performed well, rather than those they favor, while
using monetary bonuses would not. Given the different subjectivity to favoritism,
firms would rely more heavily on promotion incentives compared to monetary bonuses
than they would in the absence of such complications.
Besides the weakened desirability of using monetary bonus rewards under concerns
of favoritism, the possibility of influence activities further limits the firm’s ability to
induce effort through optimal promotion rewards. If there is no concern for influence
activities, although additional effort does have a smaller impact on promotion proba-
bility as position-specific seniority increases, the firm could optimally respond to that
by making the rewards larger. In the case when employees are risk neutral, it is not
hard to show that the optimal promotion reward scheme would induce the same level
of effort for employees with different position-specific seniority. Although risk aversion
7may change the result towards lower effort levels for more senior employees, it would
not change the prediction that the firm should increase the reward associated with
promotion for those with higher position-specific seniority. On whether firms actually
do that in real practice, both casual observations and our data suggest otherwise. If
there is the concern for influence activities, however, the reason firms do not raise the
reward on promotion to counter the decreased learning effect can be easily explained.
Under the possibility of influencing the manager, employees basically have two ways
to increase their chance of promotion. They can either invest in higher productive
effort to achieve better performance or invest in wasteful influence activities to gain
the manager’s favor. As employees get more senior in a position, the benefit of better
performance decreases as the learning completes, so the benefit of influence activities
can be reasonably assumed to remain roughly the same. As a result, more senior em-
ployees would direct more attention on influence activities compared to productive
activities, making it more costly for the firm to induce productive effort from them.
With the complications of favoritism and influence activities, firms are both con-
strained to use heavy monetary bonus rewards as well as optimize the promotion
rewards for employees with higher position-specific seniority. The combined effect
generates equilibrium employee effort that is consistent with our empirical observa-
tions: effort decreases with position-specific seniority and also reverts higher upon
promotion as the learning re-initiates.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. We present the general description
of the data and show our empirical findings in section 2. Section 3 provides the
setup of the principal-manager-employee framework and the analysis of firms’ optimal
incentive schemes under favoritism and influence. In section 4, we conclude the paper
and discuss implications of our empirical and theoretical results.
81.2 Empirical Findings
The data set we use for our empirical findings contains the personnel records of
a large U.S. firm in the service industry over the years 1969-1988. The data set
is constructed by Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom from the firm’s personnel tapes and
detailed records of the data and the firm can be found in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom
(1994a). There are a total of 74,071 employee-year observations. Each observation
contains information on employees’ ID, age, sex, education, job title, salary, bonus,
and performance rating.
The firm under investigation is a typical hierarchical firm with multi-layers and
white-collar jobs. There are a total of eight job levels from the entry positions to
the CEO.1 The bottom 4 levels contain 97.5% of the total employees and 95% of
the employees in levels 1-4 are in product creation/selling positions or staff positions
such as accounting, finance, and human resources. Within levels 1-4, the size of each
higher level is only slightly smaller than the lower level. At level 5, the size of the
level shrinks significantly to only about 10% of level 4 and remains small in levels 6-8.
In higher levels, jobs are mostly associated with planning and general management.
In levels 1-4, the average bonus is less than 7% of the base salary. The average bonus
size jumps to around 14% in levels 5-6 and 22% in levels 7-8.
According to position characteristics, we consider those in levels 1-4 in the data
as “the employees” and those in levels 5-8 as “the managers” in our model. Since
we are interested in investigating the effort dynamics of the ordinary white-collar
employees, we shall conduct our empirical analysis on the 97.5% of employees in
levels 1-4. Summary statistics of key variables for the sample of employees in levels
1-4 are shown below in Table 1.1.
1The hierarchy of the firm is back constructed from moves between jobs. The details on the
construction of the hierarchy can be found in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a).
9Table 1.1: Summary statistics of key variables for the sample of em-
ployees in levels 1-4.
General Pattern of Employee Performance
We shall use the performance rating score as our primary measure of employees’
performance. The performance rating of employees is administrated once a year and
is given on the 1-5 scales. In the original data set, the ratings are coded in descending
order, with 1 being the highest rating and 5 being the worst. For easier interpretation,
we recode the ratings in ascending order, with 1 as the worst performance and 5 as
the best. Observations of performance ratings show the leniency bias: scores are
concentrated on the higher end, with those receiving rating 1-2 accounting for only
about 1% of the data. The overall percentage of observations with ratings 3, 4 and 5
are 18%, 50%, and 31% respectively.
A general picture of the dynamics of employee performance is illustrated in Figure
1.2.1. Figure 1.2.1 shows the distribution performance rating scores of a fixed set
of employees through the first 5 years in levels 1-4. To avoid selection bias from
promotion or exit, we included only employees who have stayed more than 5 years
before promotion or exit for each of the levels shown.
We can see from Figure 1.2.1 that there is a clear pattern of decreasing performance
ratings with position-specific seniority. The percentage of employees receiving the best
10
Figure 1.2.1: Distribution of ratings scores for employees who have
stayed more than 5 years at each level.
rating, 5, is around 60% in the first year at level 1. That quickly drops to less than
20% in the third year at level 1, and to around 10% in the 5th year. The percentage
of employees receiving rating 4 remains roughly stable, while the percentage receiving
rating 3 greatly increases. The cases of ratings 1-2 are rare and are notable only in
the fourth and fifth year at level 1. The pattern is similar at all other levels.
Fixed Effect Regression Analysis
Since the pattern illustrated in Figure 1.2.1 is based on a restricted sample, we shall
next examine whether the illustrated pattern holds for the general population of
employees through regression analysis. To avoid selection bias due to unobserved
innate ability, we investigate the relationship with fixed-effect models.
The results from the fixed-effect linear and ordered logit regressions of employees’
11
performance ratings on position-specific seniority, tenure and level of position are
presented in Table 1.2. Columns (1) and (2) show the result from the fixed-effect linear
regression with level of position not included in (1) and included in (2). Columns (3)
and (4) show the result from fixed-effect ordered logit estimation with level of position
not included in (3) and included in (4). The estimation method we used is the BUC
estimation proposed in Baetschmann, Staub and Winkelmann (2011).2
Table 1.2: Fixed effect linear and ordered logit regression of perfor-
mance ratings on position specific seniority, tenure and level of position.
The results represented in Table 1.2 are consistent with the pattern shown in
Figure 1.2.1. There is a consistent and significant negative relationship between
position-specific seniority and performance ratings across all specifications. The re-
sult in column (2) suggests that an extra year at the position decreases performance
rating by approximately 0.05, which gives a decrease of a quarter grade with 5 extra
2The estimation method we used is the BUC estimation proposed in Baetschmann, Staub and
Winkelmann (2011).
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years. Since most of the performance ratings are between 3 and 5, the estimate sug-
gests a quite notable effect of decreasing performance as employees’ position-specific
seniority increases. Employees’ overall tenure at the firm also has a negative effect
on employees’ performance. However, the magnitude of the effect is much smaller
compared to that of position-specific seniority in all specifications.
The fact that the main driving force behind decreasing employee performance is
position-specific seniority rather than overall tenure is important and predicts that
performance not only decreases with years when employees stay at one level, but also
jumps up at promotion as the position-specific seniority reverts back to zero.
What’s more, the estimated effect of the level of position is positive. The level
effect adds further to the jump in performance upon promotion and may negate the
negative effect of tenure for promoted employees. With specification 2, the magnitude
of the positive effect of level is more than two times larger than the negative effect
of tenure. If an employee is promoted after two years at level 1, the estimated result
would predict that the expected rating that the employee would receive is actually
higher in his first year at level 2 compared to his first year at level 1.
If level is not controlled for, the positive effect of level could severely bias the
estimated effect of tenure on performance, as evidenced by the difference of the es-
timated coefficient on tenure between specifications (1) and (2). If the level effect is
large enough, it is possible that an uncontrolled regression of performance on tenure
would show no relationship between performance and tenure, as some of the previous
studies have found.
Addressing Alternative Explanations
Since performance ratings are subjectively evaluated, it is reasonable to question
whether the changes in performance ratings are indeed caused by changes in perfor-
mances rather than other reasons, such as supervisors’ bias or changes of standards
13
in ratings.
One well-accepted hypothesis, raised by Harris and Holmstrom, reconciles the
empirical evidence of decreasing performance ratings and the human capital theory
prediction of increasing experience and skills. Their hypothesis is that supervisors
rate employees relative to others with similar experience and tenure. In other words,
the standard of the performance rating is rising with tenure as the expected level of
performance rises. In that case, what the performance rating reveals is more about
an employee’s ability relative to others, rather than his absolute level of productivity.
Then, since those who have stayed in a position for a long time are likely of lower
ability, it is not surprising to see their performance ratings falling with tenure, as
they are gradually learned to be of low ability, or as they fall further behind due to
slow learning.
Next, we shall show empirical evidence that the decreasing performance ratings
we observed in our data are not driven by the above hypothesis. To address the
concern, we selected out the sample of employees who eventually get promoted to the
next level within our observations. Then, we separated them into high ability and
low ability groups according to how long it takes for them to get promoted. For the
whole sample, the median years taken to get promoted is 4 years for the first three
levels, and 8 years for level 4. We group employees into those who took less than
or equal to 4 years to get promoted and those who took more than 4 years. If the
relative rating hypothesis is at force in our data, we should expect the performance
ratings to increase for the high ability group and decrease for the low ability group.
The results of the regression using the sample of employees who get promoted are
shown in Table 1.3. For all three regressions, we use the fixed effect linear regression
model, as in specification (2) in Table 1.2. Comparing (1) in Table 1.3 with (2) in
Table 1.2, we can see that the estimated coefficients on both position-specific tenure
14
Table 1.3: Fixed effect lineaer regression over the sample of employees
who get promoted.
and tenure at the firm are consistent across samples. Excluding the observations of
employees who left the firm before getting promoted, or had not been promoted at
the end of our observed years has little effect on our estimated coefficients, except
that the effect of the level of position becomes much smaller and more insignificant.
Comparing across (1), (2) and (3) in Table 1.3, we can see that estimated coeffi-
cients on the position-specific tenure is quite consistent across specifications. However,
for firm tenure and level of position, the estimated results are quite different for the
high ability and low ability groups. Estimated coefficients on both tenure and level
of position are very small and insignificant for the low ability group.
From the results represented in Table 1.3, we can see that for both the high
ability and the low ability group, there is a consistent decrease of performance rating
scores with position-specific tenure. This means that the relative rating standard
15
story cannot explain the decreasing performance scores, as the performance ratings
are decreasing across samples, regardless of the employees’ relative ability.
Interpretation of the Empirical Result
The empirical result we have shown above is interesting, as it shows the opposite
of what general human capital theories would predict. As employees stay in one
position longer, they acquire skills and become more efficient at their tasks, and we
would expect increases rather than decreases in the level of performance they are
capable of. Even if performances are rated relative to expected level of performance,
we should not observe the consistent decrease of performance ratings regardless of
employees’ relative ability within the group.
If we believe that the performance ratings are not just randomly biased against
more senior employees, there must be something going on that is driving the decreas-
ing ratings. Since it is unlikely such decrease is due to decreasing ability to perform, it
is reasonable to believe it is due to the decrease in employees’ willingness to perform.
In the next section, we shall provide theoretical analysis on how this odd pattern of
employee effort could arise as equilibrium outcome even after the firm has optimized
the incentives for employees.
1.3 Model and Analysis
3.1 The Model Setup
We shall consider here a firm with three groups of actors: the principal, the manager
and the employees. The firm is owned by the principal. The manager monitors the
employees and makes management decisions. Production is carried out by employees.
Tasks that each employee carries out are complex and multi-dimensional. We assume
that while the aggregate output of the firm is measurable and contractible, each
16
individual employee’s contribution to output is hard to measure and not contractible.
We assume that at least some aspects of employees’ performance cannot be ob-
jectively measured but can be subjectively evaluated by managers. In each period t,
the manager privately observes a signal ηjt on employee j’s performance:
ηjt = aj + ejt + jt. (1.3.1)
The performance signal ηit is influenced by the employee’s ability aj, effort ejt
and a random noise term jt. We assume that an employee’s ability aj is job-specific
and initially unknown to either the firm or the employee. The prior of aj is normally
distributed as N(a0, σ
2
0) and the observational noise jt follows N(0, σ
2
 ).
Besides observing employees’ performance, the manager also forms personal pref-
erences for employees. Let fjt measure the manager’s preference of employee j in
period t. We assume that fjt is influenced by both the manager’s previous preference
fj,t−1 and the employee’s effort in interpersonal influence activities ijt. We would like
to interpret f as a comparative measure and normalize the impact of ijt as ijt−E(ijt)
keep the mean of fjt zero. Let fj0 ∼ N(0, σ2f ) denote the manager’s initial preference;
the manager’s preference fjt can be expressed as:
fjt = fj,t−1 + [ijt − E(ijt)] = fj0 +
t∑
s=1
[ijs − E(ijs)]. (1.3.2)
The Employee’s Incentives
Employees privately choose their effort ejt in productive activities and ijt in influence
activities in each period. Let the employee’s cost function be c(ejt, ijt) = cee
2
jt + cii
2
jt.
To focus on the impact of favoritism and influence activities on employees’ incentive
provision, we abstract away from the well-studied insurance vs. incentive trade-off
and assume that employees are risk-neutral .
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Let the incentive scheme for employees take a simple two step form: a certain
number of employees receives an extra reward, R, while all the others receive only
the base wage, w.3 Let p(ejt, ijt) be the probability of receiving the reward; the utility
of an employee in period t is then:
uE(ejt, ijt) = p(ejt, ijt)R + w − c(ejt, ijt). (1.3.3)
The Manager’s Incentive
In contrast to usual models of incentive provision that take managers as the principal,
in our model, managers are also self-interested agents who take actions to maximize
their own utility.
Let the manager be risk-neutral and care about his compensation, as well as his
personal preferences towards employees. There are two central assumptions we would
like to make about the manager’s incentives. First, we assume that the manager’s
compensation is tied to the output of the team he monitors and that the aggregate
output the the team can be better measured and contracted on than individual output.
Second, we assume that the manager prefers for employees that he likes better to
receive performance rewards.
Let yjt be employee j’s output and the team’s output be Yt =
∑
j
yjt. Let θ be
the sensitivity of the manager’s compensation to the team’s output. The manager’s
compensation is specified as:
w(Yt) = θYt + w = θ
∑
j
yjt + w. (1.3.4)
Let Bt be the set of employees who receive the performance reward in period t
and let uf measure the utility that the manager derives from favoritism. We assume
3It suffices to study this simple form of incentive scheme, as the shape of the reward function
does not matter under the risk neutrality assumption.
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that uf increases with fjt of the rewarded employees:
uf (Bt) =
∑
j∈Bt
fjt. (1.3.5)
Combining (1.3.4) and (1.3.5), the manager’s overall utility in period t is then:
u(Yt, Bt) = θ
∑
j
yjt + w +
∑
j∈Bt
fjt. (1.3.6)
3.2 Choice of Incentive Schemes under Favoritism and Influence
With the model basics specified above, let us first examine the effect of favoritism
and influence on incentive provision in a simple two-period context.
Let both the employees and the manager live for two periods and there be no
discounting. At the beginning of the first period, the firm commits to the manager’s
compensation, the number and the size of employees’ performance reward. In the
first period, the manager privately observes employees’ performance and determines
the set of employees to receive the performance reward. The performance reward is
then distributed at the beginning of the second period.
Incentives under Monetary Reward
Depending on whether the distribution of reward has any effect on the team’s expected
future output, performance rewards can be divided into two types. In the first type,
rewards have distributional consequences only, with bonus payments being the most
common example. We shall refer to this type of reward as “monetary reward.”
With monetary reward, the team’s output in the second period is unrelated to
the distribution of rewards. At the end of the first period, the manager chooses the
set of reward-winning employees to maximize his own expected second-period utility.
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The maximization problem of the manager is:
max
B
θ
∑
j
E(yj2) + w +
∑
j∈B
E(fj2)
⇔ max
B
∑
j∈B
E(fj2)
It is then easy to see that, under the monetary reward scheme, the manager’s
maximization problem reduces to the maximization of the utility derived from fa-
voritism. As the distribution of rewards has no effect on the second period output,
and thus the manager’s compensation, the manager will choose the set of employees
to be promoted based on his personal preference only.
Result 1. Under the monetary reward scheme, the manager chooses the set of em-
ployees to be rewarded based on his personal preference only. Employees exert positive
effort in influence activities and zero effort in productive activities.
Incentives under Promotion-Based Reward
With the second type of reward, who gets the reward does not only have distributional
consequences, but also affects future production of the team. The most common
example is promotion, in which the receipt of higher wage is accompanied with re-
assignment of the employee’s job. We shall refer to this type of reward scheme as the
“promotion-based reward.”
Let there be two job levels, and the expected output of employees for the higher
and lower levels be E(yHj ) = ρ
Haj+ej+bH and E(y
L
j ) = ρ
Laj+ej+bL respectively. We
assume ρH > ρL, that high-ability workers are more suited for the higher position,
and E(yLj |a0) > E(yHj |a0), that employees are better suited for the lower position
when they enter the firm.
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After observing an employee’s performance, the manager learns about the ability
and updates the expected output of the employee in both levels of jobs. Given the
linear form of ηjt and the normality of aj and jt, the manager’s learning follows the
normal updating rule:
E(aj|ηj1) = h0
h0 + h
a0 +
h
h0 + h
(ηj1 − e∗j1), (1.3.7)
where h0 =
1
σ20
and h0 =
1
σ2
.
Let β1 =
h
h0+h
, we can rewrite (1.3.7) as:
E(aj|ηj1) = (1− β1)a0 + β1(ηj1 − e∗j1). (1.3.8)
We can see from (1.3.8) that better first period performance increases the man-
ager’s belief about an employee’s ability, which in turn increases the manager’s belief
about the employee’s suitability for the higher level job. The manager’s maximization
problem under the promotion-based reward scheme is:
max
B
θ
∑
j
E(yj2) + w +
∑
j∈B1
E(fj2)
⇔ max
B
θ
∑
j
E(yLj2) + θ
∑
j∈B
E(yHj2)− E(yLj2) + +
∑
j∈B
E(fj2)
⇔ max
B
∑
j∈B
θ(ρH − ρL)E(aj|ηj1) + fj1
⇔ max
B
∑
j∈B
θ(ρH − ρL)β1ηj1 + fj1 (1.3.9)
We can see from (1.3.9) that the manager’s utility maximization problem can be
expressed as the maximization of a weighted combination of the employee’s perfor-
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mance and the manager’s personal preference term.
Result 2. Under the promotion-based reward scheme, the manager chooses the set of
employees to be rewarded based on both the employee’s performance and his personal
preference towards the employee.
Let p(ej1, ij1) be the probability of being promoted as a function of the employee’s
effort. Given the manager’s decision rule, it is obvious that p(ej1, ij1) is increasing in
both ej1 and ij1. Substituting the expression of ηjt and fjt into (3.9), we can derive
that:
p(ej1, ij1) = G(θ(ρ
H − ρL)β1ej1 + ij1), (1.3.10)
where G is a cumulative density function jointly determined by the distribution
of aj, jt and fj0.
The maximization problem of the employees is then:
max
ej1,ij1
p(ej1, ij1)R− c(ej1, ij1) (1.3.11)
Given (1.3.10) and (1.3.11), it is easy to derive from the first order condition that:
∂c
∂ej1
/
∂c
∂ij1
= θ(ρH − ρL)β1 (1.3.12)
Result 3. Employees exert positive effort in both productive and influence activities
under the promotion-based reward scheme. The relative level of effort spend on the
productive activities compared to influence activities increases with the manager’s
compensation sensitivity to output θ, the productivity difference parameter (ρH − ρL),
and the learning update parameter β1.
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The Firm’s Optimal Reward Scheme
Given the choice rules of the manager and the employees, the firm sets the manager’s
compensation and the reward scheme to maximize the expected joint surplus.
Proposition 1. Under favoritism and influence, the firm chooses the promotion-
based reward scheme over the monetary reward scheme to induce employee effort.
Employees exert effort in both productive and influence activities. Under the firm’s
optimal reward scheme, the level of productive effort induced is lower than the first-
best.
With Results 1-3 in previous analysis, the derivation of Proposition 1 is straightfor-
ward. When managers are subject to favoritism and influence, the promotion-based
reward scheme is preferred over the monetary reward scheme, as assignment efficiency
provides managers the implicit incentive to limit their practice of favoritism. How-
ever, as favoritism and influence activities are still present, the optimal productive
effort induced is lower than the first-best.
Note that the uncertainty and learning about an employee’s ability play an im-
portant role in creating the implicit incentive to limit favoritism. The manager cares
about an employee’s performance only because it changes his assessment of the em-
ployee’s ability. When there are more periods, the learning process completes over
time, which may well affect the effectiveness of the promotion-based scheme. In the
next subsection, we shall extend the model to more periods and examine the dynamics
of incentive provision under the promotion-based reward scheme.
3.3 Dynamics of Employee Effort
Now, let both the employees and the manager live for T periods and the discounting
factor be δ. At the beginning of the first period, the firm commits to the wage profiles
and the number of employees to promoted in each period. In each period, the manager
privately observes employees’ performance and determines the set of employees to be
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promoted. Once promoted, employees stay in the higher level.
Let Pn be the set of employees to be promoted at the end of period n. The
manager’s maximization problem at the end of period n is now:
max
Pn
∑
j∈Pn
T∑
s=n+1
δs−n[E(yHjs)− E(yLjs) + E(fjs)]
⇔ max
Pn
∑
j∈Pn
E(yHj,n+1)− E(yLj,n+1) + E(fj,n+1)
⇔ max
Pn
∑
j∈Pn
θ(ρH − ρL)E(aj|ηnj ) + fj,n
⇔ max
Pn
∑
j∈Pn
θ(ρH − ρL)βn
n∑
s=1
ηjs + fjn, (1.3.13)
where βn =
h
h0+nh
.
Let pn(e
n
j , i
n
j )be probability of an employee being promoted at the end of period
n, given his effort history enj and i
n
j . Substituting the expression of ηjs and fjn into
(1.3.13), we have:
∂pn
∂ejs
/
∂pn
∂ijs
= θ(ρH − ρL)βn ∀s ≤ n. (1.3.14)
Let Vn and V
P
n be the present value of an employee working at the lower and
higher levels in period n. We can express employee j’s present value in period n
recursively as:
Vn(e
n
j , i
n
j ) = w
L
n + δ[pn(e
n
j , i
n
j )V
P
n+1 + (1− pn(enj , inj ))Vn+1(enj , inj )] (1.3.15)
The employee’s maximization problem in period n is then:
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max V (enj , i
n
j )− c(ejn, ijn). (1.3.16)
Lemma 2. In the T-period model, employees’ effort choices in period n satisfies the
following condition:
∂c
∂ejn
/
∂c
∂ijn
<
∂c
∂ejn′
/
∂c
∂ijn′
∀n′ < n ≤ T.
Given the maximization problem derived in (1.3.16), the result in the above lemma
follows directly from the first order condition of (1.3.16). What the lemma states is
that the relative level of effort employees put on productive activities compared to
influence activities decreases as they stay in the same position for longer. With this
result, we are ready to derive the general characterization of equilibrium employee
effort under our model.
Proposition 3. Let the e∗jn be employee’s effort choice under the firm’s optimal
promotion-based incentive scheme and eE be the first-best employee effort. Then,
the following hold:
1) e∗jn < e
E ∀n;
2) e∗jn < e
∗
jn′ if n > n
′;
3) e∗n → 0 as n→∞.
Proposition 3 states that, not only are effort levels lower than the first-best under
favoritism and influence, the distortion away from the first-best gets worse as em-
ployees’ position-specific tenure increases. What’s more, if an employee stays in the
same position for a very long time, he would almost devote all his effort to influence
rather than productive activities, resulting in the firm choosing to induce very little
effort from him.
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3.4 Implications of Favoritism and Influence
monetary reward scheme and that employees’ productive effort decreases as they stay
longer in the same position. Note that these results are derived under the simplifying
assumption that there exists no external force that disciplines the manager’s prac-
tice of favoritism, be it the possible punishment from the firm or its negative effect
on the manager’s reputation. In this section, we would like to discuss the implica-
tion of favoritism and influence on incentive design and employee effort in a more
general context where objective performance measures and monitoring on subjective
evaluations are allowed to exist.
Consider a firm in which tasks to be performed at each job are complex and
multidimensional. Let (t1, t2, .., tn) be the set of tasks relevant for production, and
−→e = (e1, e2, .., en) be the vector of efforts spent in the set of tasks. Let f(−→e ) =
−→α · −→e = α1e1 +α2e2 + ..+αnen be the value of output produced as a function of the
efforts.
Let there exist a contractible performance measure m(−→e ) = −→β · −→e . The con-
tractible measure is imperfect in the sense that there exists no multiplier r such that
r
−→
β = −→α . The most common example of imperfection is that βx = 0 for some x, which
means some aspect of the tasks to be performed is not covered by the contractible
measure.
On the other hand, subjective evaluations can be formed over any specific task tx.
We denote the subjective evaluation of task x by sx(
−→e ) = ψxex.
Incentive Provision under No Favoritism or Influence
When managers are not subject to favoritism and are expected to carry out per-
formance evaluations honestly, the firm can base its incentive scheme on subjective
evaluations without any additional cost. In such cases, subjective evaluations can be
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used as if they are objective measures.
It is then easy to see that it is possible to construct a perfect measure of per-
formance based on subjective evaluations by choosing an appropriate weight on each
sx according to
−→α . When there exists no favoritism or influence, imperfection in
objective measures posts no constraint on the incentive provision for employees. The
problem of incentive provision goes back to the classical insurance-incentive tradeoff,
and first-best effort can be achieved if employees are risk-neutral.
Incentive Provision under Favoritism and Influence
In the presence of favoritism and influence, use of subjective evaluations carries the
associated cost of influence activities. Influence costs associated with promotion-based
incentives may be lower than those associated with monetary incentives, depending on
employees’ position-specific seniority and how well external punishment mechanisms
such as reputation work. However, monetary incentive is more flexible, as it can be
based the firm’s choice of any combination of sx. Objective measures, although may
not be perfect, are not susceptible to the problem of favoritism and influence cost.
As a result, the firm’s optimal incentive scheme may be a combination of monetary
reward based on objective measures, monetary reward based on subjective evaluations
and reward associated with promotion.
Note that, for monetary reward based on objective and subjective measures of
performance, there is no obvious reason why its effectiveness should change over
time. On the other hand, the effectiveness of promotion-based reward decreases with
employees’ position-specific seniority.
Proposition 4. When managers are not subject to favoritism and influence, the effort
of employees under the firm’s optimal incentive scheme does not vary with employees’
position-specific seniority. When managers are subject to favoritism and influence, if
there exists some aspect of effort ex that is better induced through promotion compared
to other options, ex decreases as the employees’ position-specific seniority increases.
27
Proposition 4 states that, even under relaxed assumptions about the firm’s avail-
able incentive instruments, the existence of favoritism and influence would result in
decreasing employee effort with position-specific seniority as long as there is some
aspect of employees’ performance that is either not well measured, or not easily ob-
servable to other employees for the reputation mechanism to work.
1.4 Conclusion
Economic literature has traditionally studied too little about the incentive provision of
the group of employees whose output is hard to measure and subjectively evaluated
by managers. With 20 years of personnel data from a large firm, we show that
employee effort is not optimized in the way that classical incentive theories would
predict. With the insight from our empirical work, we set out to explain in theory
why the firm’s optimization of employee effort would be constrained in such a way
that it produces the pattern of employee effort we observe in the data. We show
with an enriched principal-manager-employee framework that real life complications
such as favoritism and influence could result in decreasing equilibrium effort with
seniority even after the firm has optimized its incentive schemes. The empirical
observation that an employee’s effort decreases as he stays in the same position for
longer and the theoretical result that such decreasing effort could be more than just
poor incentive management, but a result of real life constraints, has several important
implications. First, in contrast to most human capital theories, decreasing effort
means that it is possible for an employee’s productivity to decrease as he stays longer
in his position. Second, if an employee’s effort decreases as position-specific tenure
increases, firms would face higher pressure to promote employees with higher position-
specific seniority. This gives a rational explanation of why seniority is usually taken
into account in promotion decisions. Third, decreasing effort with position-specific
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seniority points to the importance of designing career paths with appropriate step
lengths. A career path with fewer expected years to progress to the next level is
preferred to one with longer expected years, as the cost of decreasing effort becomes
larger as employees stay longer in the same position.
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Chapter 2
Employer Learning, Firing Threat and the
Peter Principle
2.1 Introduction
When a boss asks his employee to prepare a set of important documents, the employee
usually does it to the best of his effort, even when the quality of the prepared docu-
ments is never written into the employment contract, can never be verified in court
and does not directly affect the employee’s wage. In typical employment relationships,
as depicted in Simon (1951), contracts are usually vague, but employers possess the
power of asking employees for specific tasks to be performed later according to their
needs.
In the large body of literature on the theory of the firm pioneered by Coase
(1937) and Williamson (1975), the power of employers to make employees perform
tasks beyond what can be contracted on is often viewed as central to the functioning
of the firm and counted as one important advantage of transacting within firms.
In most of these works, however, the reason why employers possess such power is
often assumed rather than carefully discussed. Among others, the threat of firing is
often quoted as the reason why employers are able to command employees beyond
what is written in contracts. Although the threat of firing is widely accepted as a
disciplining device in efficiency wage models, such as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
those models adopt a fully contractible framework which ensures the credibility of the
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firing threat. In a framework with incomplete contracts, where the believed authority
power of employers matters, the credibility of the firing threat becomes problematic.
In particular, if the firing policy is non-contractible, after an employee is observed
with low effort, would it indeed be optimal for the employer to fire the employee? By
the time the employer considers whether to fire or not, the damage of low effort is
already sunk. If there is any small cost of firing, the act of firing the worker could
well not be optimal ex-post. Without ex-post optimality, the threat of firing would
just be an empty threat.
Regarding the empty threat problem, previous literature often takes the view
that it can be solved through repeated interactions, with the reputation mechanism,
as in Kreps and Wilson (1982), or through relational contracts, as in Levin (2003).
The limitation of relying on such repeated game models is that, firstly, in many
situations where the power of employers matters, the time horizon is not long enough
for reputation or relational contracts to form. Secondly, the working of the reputation
mechanism relies on the public observability of performances, which may not be the
case in real life. In many cases, especially when employees directly provide service to
their bosses, actions taken by employees are privately observed by the boss only. It is
then hard for any reputation concern to have an effect on employer’s firing decisions.
Despite these theoretical difficulties, the threat of firing is widely believed to be
effective in a wide range of employment relationships. In particular, the credibility of
the firing threat seems unaffected by privately observed effort or short employment
horizons in real life. We therefore believe that there exists a more general mechanism
ensuring the credibility of the firing threat besides the repeated games theories.
In this paper, we propose that an employer’s learning could be the mechanism
ensuring the credibility of the firing threat, and it works even under the harshest
possible environment - when neither output nor effort is contractible, when effort is
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only privately observed and when the time horizon is short. When there are different
types of employees with different propensities to provide consummate effort, the effort
choice of an employee does not only affect his output for that period, but also affects
the employer’s belief about his type. As employment continues, employers learn about
an employee’s type and adjust their assessment of the employee’s value each period. It
would then be optimal for the employer to carry out the firing threat after observing
low effort, whenever the low effort reduces the employer’s valuation of the employee
by more than the cost of firing.
With the credibility of the firing threat ensured by employer learning and appro-
priate wage setting, it is then possible for the employer to achieve positive discipline
power over employees even under the setting with privately observed and not con-
tractible output and effort. However, as the credibility of the firing threat depends
on employer learning and adjustment of beliefs, it is natural to wonder what happens
when uncertainty about the employee’s type resolves with time.
Under the extended multi-period framework, we show that, when there exists noise
in a firm’s valuation of employees, no matter how small the noise is, the threat of firing
loses its effectiveness as learning completes. Intuitively, when an employee is learned
with near certainty to be competent, his further actions will have very little impact
on the employer’s assessment of his future value; thus, the possible effect of discipline
through the firing threat is very small. At the same time, firing a worker becomes
more and more costly as the probability of the employee being competent increases.
Therefore, when the employer’s belief of an employee’s probability of being competent
passes a certain level, the threat of firing will no longer be optimal and thus, loses its
credibility. Given that no more effective discipline can be achieved through the firing
threat when the learning over an employee’s type completes, it would be optimal
for employers to maintain some uncertainty about employees’ types if possible. If
32
promoting a worker into a higher level can introduce additional uncertainty when an
employee is known to be competent at the current level with near certainty, optimal
promotion policy resembling the Peter Principle could arise out of our model.
The Peter Principle, as discussed in Peter and Hull (1969), describes the promotion
policy that employees are promoted based on their performance in their current posi-
tion, rather than on abilities relevant to the higher position. Under such a promotion
policy, employees are promoted to the next level once they are shown to be compe-
tent in the current level, and will eventually be promoted to a level of incompetency.
Eventually, all positions would be occupied by employees who are incompetent.
From the perspective of assignment only, the Peter Principle is clearly inefficient.
In the management literature, it is widely criticized and often regarded as bad man-
agement practice. In the economic literature, Fairburn and Malcomson (2001) show
that when performance is unverifiable and managers can be bribed by employees, the
optimal promotion rule may involve promoting too many workers than is efficient,
which they refer to as the Peter Principle effect. Lazear (2004) takes a different per-
spective and describes the Peter Principle effect as the decrease in the performance of
employees after they are promoted. Lazear (2004) referred to the negative correlation
between job and tenure found in Medoff and Abraham (1980) and between wage and
job tenure in Lazear (1992) as the Peter Principle and argues that it could simply
be a result of the regression-to-the-mean effect. What our model explains, however,
is not the consequences of the Peter Principle that too many are promoted, or that
performance drops after promotion. Rather, our model concerns the rationality of
the Peter Principle as a supposedly inefficient practice of promoting workers based
on their performance in current positions rather than suitability for the positions to
be promoted into.
With our model of employer learning, we show that the Peter Principle could
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be driven by the firm’s concern to maintain effective discipline through the firing
threat. As an employee is shown to be competent at his current level, he reaches
a stage when the firing threat is no longer credible and there is no more incentive
to provide consummate effort. The competent worker thus enters into a stage of
complacency and the effort level decreases. To avoid the decreased effort, the firm
has the incentive to promote the worker into a higher level with more difficult tasks,
such that the learning restarts and it is possible to discipline the worker again.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we show formally
with a simple two-period model that, with employer learning, it is always possible for
employers to establish positive discipline power through a credible firing threat and
it is optimal for them to do so. In section 3, we extend the model to multi-periods
and explore the function of the firing threat when learning approaches completion.
In section 4, we explore the implications of our model on firms’ promotion policy.
In particular, we show that delete comma the completion of learning and the loss of
effective discipline provide a rational explanation of the Peter Principle. In section 5,
we conclude this chapter.
2.2 A Model of Employer Learning and Credible Firing Threat
2.2.1 The Model Setup
Let there be many firms and many workers. Let the labor market be competitive,
and the cost of firing and job searching be positive but infinitely close to 0. Firms
are profit maximizers and workers are risk-neutral utility maximizers. For the base
model, let there be two periods and the discounting factor be δ.
Types of Workers Let there be two types of workers for each job position. A
worker can either be competent or incompetent for a given job. We assume that the
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competency of a worker is job-specific and the prior of a worker being competent for
a given job is α.
Effort Levels Let there be two possible effort levels. The lower effort level, which
we refer to as the perfunctory effort, is always contractible and denoted by eL. The
higher effort level, which we refer to as consummate effort, is not contractible and
denoted by eH . We assume that during production, the effort levels of workers are
observed by their employers.
Cost of Effort Let c be cost of providing consummate effort. Since perfunctory
effort can always be enforced, we normalize its cost to 0. Let c ∼ GH when the
worker is competent and c ∼ GL when the worker is incompetent, where GH and GL
are continuous distributions with support (0,∞). Assume that incompetent workers
find it more costly to provide consummate effort in the first order stochastic dominant
sense, i.e. GL(c) ≥ GH(c) ∀c ∈ (0,∞).
Productivity We assume that due to team work or task complexity, a worker’s out-
put y is not contractible or immediately observable. However, employers understand
that the expected output of a worker varies with his competency and effort. Let
yHeL , y
H
eH
,yLeL ,y
L
eH
be the expected output levels of competent and incompetent workers
when they provide perfunctory and consummate effort respectively. We assume that
yHe > y
L
e for both e = eL and e = eH , y
a
eH
> yaeL for both a = H and a = L.
2.2.2 Existence of Employment Equilibrium with Credible Firing Threat
The Employment Contract
Since neither output nor effort is contractible, the employment contract in a two-
period setting is simply a pair of wages (w1, w2), with the option to terminate by any
party at the end of period 1.
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At the end of period 1, the only information available to the firm, and that the
continuation of employment could be made contingent upon, is the employee’s ob-
served effort level. Let a firing threat be the firm’s conditional continuation policy
that the original employment contract will be continued if consummate effort is ob-
served, and terminated otherwise. Let T be the reduction in the worker’s payoff if
the original contract is terminated; T then measures the effective disciplining power
from the firing threat.
Firms’ Learning and Updating of Beliefs
For the firm to optimally decide whether to carry out the firing threat or not, it
must correctly update a worker’s expected continuation value according to available
information, which is the worker’s first period effort choice here.
For a given T , a worker will choose consummate effort with probability GH(T )
if he is competent and GL(T ) if he is incompetent. Let α
H and αL be the updated
probability of a worker being competent after consummate effort and perfunctory
effort are observed respectively. Then, according to the Beyes’ Rule:
αH(T ) =
αGH(T )
αGH(T ) + (1− α)GL(T ) ;
αL(T ) =
α(1−GH(T ))
α(1−GH(T )) + (1− α)(1−GL(T )) .
Since we know that GH(c) ≤ GL(c) ∀c ∈ (0,∞), it follows that, for any given T ,
GH(T ) < GL(T ) and (1 − GH(T )) > (1 − GL(T )). It is then easy to see from here
thatαL(T ) ≤ α ≤ αH(T ) for any T .
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Credibility of the Firing Threat
For employees to be disciplined by the firing threat, it must be credible. In other
words, the conditional employment policy contingent upon observed effort levels must
be ex-post optimal. To determine the conditions for the firing threat to be credible,
we need to compute a worker’s second period expected output based on his first period
effort choice.
Since period 2 is the last period, workers will only provide perfunctory effort
because there is no more future to keep them disciplined. Then, according to the up-
dated beliefs, the second period expected output of a worker is E(y|eH) = αH(T )(yHeL−
yLeL) + y
L
eL
if consummate effort is observed and E(y|eL) = αL(T )(yHeL − yLeL) + yLeL if
perfunctory effort is observed.
In a competitive labor market, the expected payoff of hiring a new employee is
always 0. Given the infinitely small firing cost, the firm’s decision on keeping or
replacing a continuing employee is then: keep if E(y|ei) ≥ w2 or fire if E(y|ei) < w2.
Given the previously computed expected second period output, with wage contract
(w1, w2), the firm’s firing threat is credible if:
αL(T )(yHeL − yLeL) + yLeL < w2 ≤ αH(T )(yHeL − yLeL) + yLeL . (2.2.1)
Employment Equilibrium
Throughout the previous analysis, we have taken the discipline power T as given.
In equilibrium, however, the discipline power T used in belief updating must be
consistent with the actual cost of getting fired for workers.
Since we assumed that competency is job-specific, the worst a worker can do
after getting fired is start a new career with the prior competency probability α.
In a competitive labor market, workers’ second period outside option is then wo2 =
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α(yHeL − yLeL) + yLeL . With contracted continuation wage w2 and infinitely small search
cost, the value of staying at a worker’s current job is then:
T = w2 − wo2 = w2 − [α(yHeL − yLeL) + yLeL ]. (2.2.2)
Let ((w1,w2), T ) be an employment relationship with contracted wage (w1, w2) and
expected discipline power T . We say that ((w1,w2), T ) is an employment equilibrium
if: 1) the firing threat is credible if T > 0, i.e. condition 2.2.1 is satisfied if T > 0; 2)
the expectation of the discipline power is consistent, i.e. condition 2.2.2 is satisfied;
and 3) the firm’s expected profit is 0.
Proposition 5. If GH and GL are continuous and
gH(T )
gL(T )
9 1 as T → 0, then there
always exist T > 0 and (w1, w2) such that ((w1,w2), T ) is an employment equilibrium.
The significance of Proposition 5 is that, even under the situations when neither
output nor effort is contractible, employees would still be willing to provide more
than perfunctory effort due to the fear of getting fired. Note that our model does not
require the output or effort choices to be observable by the outside market. Thus,
this model is a step forward from the Holmstrom (1999) career concerns model, in
which the incentive to exert effort comes from the adjustment of market wages with
observed performance.
Moreover, the two-period nature of this model demonstrates that the discipline
power of firing threats can be effective, even under extremely a short time horizon.
Thus, our model is applicable to a wider range of employment situations and compli-
ments the relational contract literature that builds on infinitely repeated interactions.
Lastly, the discipline power from the threat of firing in our model is unaffected
even if the worker’s effort choice is privately observed by his employer only. With
publicly observed effort, it is possible to establish a credible firing threat based on
the reputation concern of the firm. In such reputation models, learning happens in
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the opposite direction - employees learn whether an employer is strict with discipline
by observing his actions toward other employees. Thus, employers are motivated to
carry out the firing threat even with ex-post cost in order to maintain their reputation
on discipline. The reputation model is widely applicable to many employment situa-
tions, but has its limitations due to its reliance on public observability of performance
or effort. In the white collar workplace, employees often perform tasks in individual
settings and the quality of an employee’s work is usually overseen by the supervisor
only. Since our model of employer learning does not require publicly observed per-
formance or effort, it covers an even wider range of employment situations than the
reputation model.
2.2.3 Optimality of the use of the Firing Threat
In the previous section, we developed the existence of employment equilibrium in
which positive discipline power is achieved through credible firing threat. Given the
possibility of achieving discipline power through the threat of firing, firms still face
the choice of whether to establish the firing threat and the choice of equilibrium under
multiple equilibria possibilities.
In the two-period setting, the employer’s optimal choice is straightforward. After
observing the effort choice in period 1,, a continuation worker’s updated prior is
either αH(T ) or aL(T ). From previous analysis, we know that αL(T ) ≤ α ≤ αH(T )
for any T . Since the worker can always exit and start a new career with prior α and
we’ve assumed infinitely small labor market frictions, it is always socially optimal
for workers who have chosen perfunctory effort in the first period to leave the firm,
and for those who have chosen consummate effort to stay. In other words, there is
no efficiency loss of setting up and carrying out the firing threat. At the same time,
there is efficiency gain in achieving more efficient effort by setting up the firing threat.
Let S(T ) be the set of all T ’s such that ((w1, w2), T ) is an employment equilibrium,
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and α(T ) be the updated prior given an observed effort cost of T .
Proposition 6. In the two-period model, it is always efficient for the firm to choose
an equilibrium with T > 0. If GH and GL are continuous
gH(T )
gL(T )
is monotone decreasing
in T , the firm’s optimal choice of equilibrium is T ∗ = max{S(T )|T ≤ V (T )}, where
V (T ) = α(T )(yHeH − yHeL) + (1− α(T ))(yLeH − yLeL).
Proposition 6 establishes that, in the base two-period model, it is always efficient
for the firm to establish the firing threat. With the regularity condition of monotone
decreasing gH(T )
gL(T )
, which is satisfied by most families of distribution functions such as
normally distributed GH and GL, the firm would choose the largest possible T , as
long as T is not greater than the expected value gain from consummate effort.
2.3 Model Extension and Limitations of the Firing Threat
In the previous section, we showed with the two-period model that, even when neither
output nor effort is contractible, it is possible for the employer to establish positive
discipline power through credible firing threat and it is optimal for the employer to
do so. In this section, we extend the model to discuss the use and limitations of firing
threats in multi-period settings.
In the two-period setting, the effectiveness and optimality of the firing threat are
greatly simplified by the fact that there is only one stage of learning and that the
starting prior of learning within the firm is the same as the prior that a worker would
restart his career with after getting fired. However, this is no longer the case when
there are more periods.
The Completion of Learning
When an employment relationship continues for multi-periods, the learning of the
employee’s competency also continues. Since an employee is either competent or
incompetent, when learning periods are long enough, the learning would eventually
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reach a point where the employer is almost sure about the employee’s type. Since
it is always optimal for the firm to fire an employee once his expected probability of
competency falls below the average outside level, the eventual completion of learning
will only happen in one direction - the expectation of almost certain competency.
Let everything be same as in the base model, except, now, allow the employment
relationship to continue for N > 2 periods. Let αt denote the prior of a worker’s
believed probability of being competent at the end of period t.
Lemma 7. Consider an employee who has stayed in the same firm for t periods. If
in all t periods, the discipline power from the firing threat T is positive and gH(T )
gL(T )
9 1
as T → 0, then at → 1 as t→∞.
Lemma 7 states that, if the firing threat is effective for all periods during an
employee’s tenure, then eventually the learning over the employee’s type would reach
a point when the employer is almost sure that he is competent.
Since it is not unusual to have long-lasting employment relationships in real life,
given that the learning will eventually approach almost certain competency, it is
important to discuss the effectiveness of the firing threat under such conditions.
The Effectiveness of the Firing Threat
As we have discussed in our previous analysis, the credibility of the firing threat
depends on the ex-post optimality condition: the expected net value of a worker to
the firm should be positive if he is to be retained, and negative if he is to be fired. In
the two-period case, this is the optimality equation 2.2.1.
Consider the same optimality condition as in 2.2.1, but now, allow the starting
prior to be αt instead of α. In the two period case, if there is scope of learning to
start with - in other words, if the market prior α is not close to 0 or 1 - there should
be some distance between αH and αL. In the multi-period case, however, since we
are starting with αt, and we know from Lemma 7 that αt could be very close to 1
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if t is large enough, there could be very little scope of learning left. The result of
the almost certain starting prior is that, after effort is observed, whether the effort
choice is consummate or perfunctory would have very little effect on αt+1, and thus,
very little effect on the worker’s continuation value to the firm. Although it is still
possible to set the continuation wages such that the optimality condition is satisfied,
the function of the firing threat would require extremely accurate setting of wages
and absolutely zero noise, which is unrealistic in real life.
Since a worker’s continuation value after consummate or perfunctory effort would
be extremely close when αt is very close to 1, when we allow random noise in the
employer’s ex-post decision, setting the continuation wage in between the two values
would result in the worker being retained or fired almost solely due to the noise.
Let there be a random noise to a worker’s expected value at the end of each period,
and let the noise  be normally distributed in [−ε, ε], where ε is a small number.
Lemma 8. Given any positive ε, if there exist employment equilibria with positive
Tt, then the maximum possible equilibrium discipline power max{Tt|Tt ∈ St} → 0 as
αt−1 → 1.
Lemma 8 states that, if there exists some noise in the firm’s valuation of employees,
no matter how small that noise is, as learning completes, the maximum discipline
power that can be achieved through credible firing threat would approach zero.
The Cost of Using the Firing Threat
At the same time, the cost of using the threat of firing is no longer always zero as
in the two-period case. In the two-period case, the updated prior of a worker always
falls below the market level after perfunctory effort is observed in the first period;
thus, firing such workers would result in no efficiency loss. This is no longer the case
in the multi-period setting, as the starting prior before update is now αt−1 instead of
α. The execution of the firing threat would result in inefficient separation whenever
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at(at−1, L) is greater than α.
Let Lt(at−1) be the expected total surplus of the next period of employment
when not firing anyone at the end of t, minus that of firing a worker after observing
perfunctory performance. Lt(at−1) thus measures the loss of surplus due to inefficient
separation.
Lemma 9. As αt−1 → 1, there exist L > 0 such that the loss of efficiency from
separation Lt(at−1)→ L.
Lemma 9 states that, as learning completes, the expected loss resulting from
inefficient separation approaches a positive level.
With the previous three Lemmas, we’ve established that 1) the learning approaches
almost certain competency as an employee stays longer in the firm; 2) the maximum
discipline power that can be achieved through the firing threat approaches zero as
learning completes; 3) the efficiency loss of using the firing threat approaches a positive
level as learning completes.
Given the above, we can derive the following result:
Proposition 10. When N is large enough, there exist t and
∼
at such that, if at >
∼
at,
then no discipline power can be achieved through the threat of firing after period t,
and the learning process stops.
Proposition 10 establishes that, in multi-period settings, as long as there are long
enough periods, the learning would eventually reach a point when no more discipline
power can be achieved through the threat of firing. Intuitively, as we discussed before,
when there is no learning, and no output nor effort can be contracted on, there is a
credibility problem with the use of the firing threat. When we introduce employees’
competency types and learning into the model in the previous section, the difference
in ex-post expected values of employees makes it possible to establish credible threat
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of firing. In the multi-period case, as learning completes and the uncertainty over
employees’ competency disappears, we are again approaching the initial case where
there is no learning. The approaching zero benefit and positive cost of using the firing
threat again makes it not credible for the firm to use the threat of firing. Therefore,
what we’ve established here is that the use of the firing threat has a finite life and it
ends when there is too little uncertainty about an employee’s competency.
2.4 Discipline through the Firing Threat and the Peter Prin-
ciple
In the previous two sections, we’ve shown that, when neither output nor effort is
contractible, employers could establish discipline power over employees through the
firing threat and that such discipline loses its effectiveness as the learning over em-
ployees’ competency completes. In this section, we shall discuss the implications of
such changes on the firm’s promotion policy. In particular, we will show that the
completion of learning and the loss of effective discipline could provide a rational
explanation of the Peter Principle.
The Model with Promotion
In order to discuss the implications of our model on job assignment, let us first extend
the structure of the model to allow for more job levels.
Let there be two different job levels in the firm, the lower and the higher level. Let
there be two tasks a and b. The productivity of a worker at the lower level depends
on his performance in task a only while the productivity of a worker in the higher
level depends on his performance in both task a and task b.
Let yL1, yL2 be the worker’s productivity in the lower level and higher level respec-
tively, and ya and yb be the productivity of the worker associated with performing
task a and task b respectively. Let yL1 = ya + B, where B is some constant and
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yL2 = ya + yb.
A worker could either be competent or incompetent in task a and in task b. Let
the market prior of a worker being competent in task a be α and in task b be β.
Assume that competency in task a is independent from competency in task b.
Let the cost of providing consummate effort in the lower level be GH when the
worker is competent in task a and GL if incompetent in task a. In the higher level,
the cost of providing consummate effort is GH if the worker is competent in both task
a and task b, and GL otherwise.
Let the learning update and the rest of the model setup be the same as in the
base model.
Optimal Promotion Policy without Considering Employee Effort
Consider first the situation that there is no productivity difference between consum-
mate and perfunctory effort and consider only the efficient assignment of job positions.
Let αt and βt be the expected probability of a worker being competent in tasks a
and b in period t respectively. Since yL1 = ya + B and yL2 = ya + yb, it is clear that,
without considering the effect of effort, promotion should always be made based on
βt and the level of αt should not affect the firm’s assignment decision.
Optimal Promotion Policy with Changing Discipline Power
Now, consider the situation where effort makes a difference on productivity and when
neither output nor effort is contractible. We are therefore in a situation where em-
ployers can establish effective discipline over employees through the firing threat in
early periods but they lose such power as the learning completes.
As we have shown previously that the effectiveness of discipline through the fir-
ing threat depends crucially on the uncertainty about the employee’s competency.
For a worker who is learned to be competent almost certainly in task a, promoting
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him to the higher level or not now has another effect beyond assignment efficiency
- the promotion to the higher level will reintroduce uncertainty into the employee’s
competency.
After a worker is learned to be competent in task a and the firing threat loses its
discipline power in the lower position, the learning can start again with respect to
the employee’s competency in task b if he is promoted to the higher level. Since the
restart of learning will again make it possible to increase employee effort through the
firing threat, the firm has the incentive to promote competent workers into the higher
level to achieve higher employee effort.
Proposition 11. Letβˆt be the efficient threshold of βt for promotion in terms of
assignment only. When employee effort is taken into account, there exist
∼
at and
βˆ
′
t < βˆt such that it is optimal to promote employees with βˆ
′
t ≤ βt < βˆt if at >∼
at. Furthermore, if no learning over β happens in the first level, employees will be
promoted based solely on at.
Proposition 11 states that, when we take into account the need to sustain employ-
ees’ effort through credible firing threat, it is no longer inefficient to decide promotion
based on current level competency. In particular, when employers could somehow ob-
serve signals on the employee’s competency in task b, being competent in task a lowers
the required belief of βt for an employee to be promoted. In this case, even if the em-
ployee’s productivity would decrease from the pure assignment perspective, he could
still be promoted to the higher level in order for consummate effort to be sustained.
Furthermore, if employers could not effectively determine an employee’s probability
of competency in task b based on his performances in the lower level, promotions
would be made purely based on concerns of sustaining effort, thus determined purely
by at. In that case, we would have an optimal promotion policy exactly the same as
that the Peter Principle describes.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an employment model with employer learning to provide
the foundation of credible firing threat in an employment relationship when neither
output nor effort is contractible. With a two-period model, we show that credible
firing threat can be achieved even when the time horizon is extremely short. When
the employer is not sure about an employee’s type, the employee’s actions acts as
signals to the employer and change the employer’s belief about the employee’s future
productivity, which ensures the ex-post credibility of firing threats. As the ex-post
credibility of firing threat is dependent on the learning and uncertainty over the
employee, the use of firing threat as a disciplinary device becomes problematic when
the employer is almost sure about the employee’s competence at the job. To sustain
the employee’s incentives, the employer may find it optimal to promote him into
more difficult tasks, even though this results in an immediate decrease in expected
base output. Our model thus provides a rational explanation for the Peter Principle:
employees who are known to be competent at the current level are promoted to higher
levels in order to sustain their incentives to provide consummate effort.
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Chapter 3
Testing Asymmetric Learning Using Wage
Data
3.1 Introduction
When a firm hires a new graduate, it tries to assess as correctly as possible the pro-
ductivity of the potential hire from all information available - education, background,
interviews and so on. Firms form their beliefs about a worker and make offers corre-
sponding to their beliefs. This assessment, however, is never perfect. Due to imper-
fect information, employers’ starting beliefs of a worker’s productivity often reflect
statistical averages rather than true individual productivity. As the employment re-
lationship goes on, however, the employing firm observes the worker’s performance
and more information on the worker’s productivity is revealed. Firms are then able to
update their beliefs and make more precise assessments of the worker’s productivity.
In other words, employers learn about a worker’s productivity over time.
One important question about this learning process is whether firms observe the
same performance signals. Early works like Freeman (1977) and Harris and Holm-
strom (1982) primarily adopted the symmetric learning hypothesis due to its simple
structure. In their models, all firms receive the same signals and the learning pro-
cess is identical for incumbent and outside firms. Later works, such as Waldman
(1984, 1996), Greenwald (1986) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) consider the case
when incumbent firms hold information not known to outside firms and explore the
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implication of such information asymmetry. Since incumbent firms are likely to be
able to observe employee performance more closely, most models with asymmetric
learning assume that incumbent firms hold more precise information. Lazear (1984)
takes a different approach and assumes that each firm receives different signals; how-
ever, incumbent firms’ signals are not better than outside firms.’ In other words, the
learning processes are different for each firm, but the incumbent firms do not possess
a unique information advantage when compared to outsiders. Here, we shall refer to
the asymmetric learning hypothesis as the case when incumbent firms hold superior
information compared to outsiders.
The major implication of the asymmetric learning hypothesis is that, with infor-
mational advantage on wage setting, the incumbent firm is able to extract rent from
the worker and takes actions to maximize that rent. In Waldman (1984), firms are
reluctant to promote workers when learning is asymmetric, as promotion reveals part
of the incumbent-knows-only information to the market. Asymmetric learning thus
leads to inefficient job assignment in Waldman (1984). In Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998), however, asymmetric learning makes firms willing to invest in general train-
ing. As firms are able to pay below the marginal productivity of the worker, they
extract partial benefits of general trainings, and thus would be willing to invest in
them.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) first proposed a test of asymmetric learning and the
resulting adverse selection using layoffs. The main idea is that if the learning is
asymmetric, being laid off is a bad signal to the outside market, while losing a job
on a plant closure is not. Laid-off workers are then expected to experience a larger
decrease in wage compared to movers due to plant closure. Using data from the
Current Population Survey, Gibbons and Katz find support for asymmetric learning.
Doiron (1995) and Grund (1999) used the same testing method with data from Canada
49
and Germany, and found mixed support for asymmetric learning. Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998) adopted a similar idea, that quitters of the apprentice programs due
to military service receive higher wages than those who are laid off or quit voluntarily,
because they do not suffer from adverse selection. Moreover, military quitters could
even receive higher wages than stayers, as stayers are paid less than their marginal
productivity due to incumbent firms’ information monopoly, while military quitters
receive competitive wage offers. With data on Germany apprentices, they found
support for asymmetric learning.
In a more recent paper, Schonberg (2007) proposes a new test of asymmetric
learning using AFQT scores. The main idea is determining whether the incumbent
and the outsider have the same information from whether AFQT score’s impact on
wages changes differently with tenure and experience. If information is symmetric,
the learning process should not be affected by the change of firms; thus, the AFQT
score’s impact on wages should not vary with tenure after controlling for experience.
If information is asymmetric, the AFQT score’s impact on wages should increase with
tenure. Using data from NLSY79, Schonberg (2007) found no evidence of asymmetric
learning in general, except some weak evidence when workers are college graduates.
In this paper, we propose a new test of asymmetric learning using wage data.
The central innovation of our method is that it does not depend on variables such
as reasons of displacement or AFQT scores, and only requires the observation of
wage and employment histories of workers. Due to the minimal requirement of key
variables, our testing method opens up the possibility of using the much larger and
more precise administrative data sets to test asymmetric learning instead of depending
on survey data. The central idea of our testing method is that, under either the
symmetric or asymmetric hypothesis, employer’s learning over a worker’s productivity
is reflected in the changes in the worker’s wages. Since individual wages are unlikely
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to be fully transparent to the market, the changes in past wages reflect a worker’s
ability, not observed by later employers, but observed by econometricians, just like
AFQT scores.
Intuitively, a worker is more likely to get a better wage adjustment if his perfor-
mance reveals favorable information about his productivity beyond the employer’s
initial expectation. No matter what wage setting mechanism we assume, it is safe to
expect that a worker’s wage increases with his employer’s belief about his productiv-
ity. Under asymmetric learning, past wage increase of a worker positively correlates
with the worker’s ability and is information that later employers cannot take into
account in their wage offers. Conditional on a worker’s employment history, in a pool
of workers who look the same to a new employer, a worker who is revealed to be pro-
ductive to his prior employer is more likely to be of high productivity, and thus, more
likely to be productive later, and receive higher wage raises later on. Under sym-
metric learning, however, all the information revealed to econometricians through
past wage changes is already available to later employers. When workers changes
firms, there is no pooling that happens. All the available information, including past
performances, has already been taken into account and reflected in the new firm’s
offering wages. Thus, conditional on the new firm’s offering wage, past wage changes
should add no new information and should not predict future wage changes. Thus,
given workers’ employment and wage histories, we can test whether the learning is
asymmetric or symmetric by testing whether past wage changes predict future wage
changes, conditional on observable characteristics, employment history and current
wage levels.
Given the above idea, we develop a two-step testing strategy as follows. Consider
the set of workers who have just switched to a new firm. First, we regress future wage
on current wage and all the other observable characteristics. Given the estimated
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parameters, we predict the residual of the fitted regression. The residual term then
measures how much the actual future wage deviates from what we would expect from
his current wage and other characteristics. Then, we take the residual of the first stage
regression and regress the residual on past wage increase. If learning is symmetric,
past wage increase should not predict future wage conditional on current wage; thus,
we should observe the estimated parameter on past wage increase in the second stage
regression to be close to zero. On the other hand, if learning is symmetric, past
wage increase should reveal positive signal about the employee’s productivity, which
has not been taken into account into the current wage. Therefore, we should expect
the estimated parameter on past wage increase in the second stage regression to be
positive.
Due to data accessibility, at this stage, we are not able to implement our test
on an administrative data set, which is the type of data that our testing method
is most suitable for. Instead, we have implemented our testing strategy with the
publicly available National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). With data
from NLSY97, our empirical result gives a close to zero and insignificant estimated
parameter of past wage increase in the second stage regression, and thus, is consistent
with symmetric rather than asymmetric learning.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a model of
learning with multi-periods and analyze the model predictions on wage patterns under
both symmetric and asymmetric learning hypotheses. We also explore the robustness
of our model predictions under alternative model specifications. In section 3, we
discuss the strategy of empirical implementation based on our theoretical predictions.
In section 4, we describe the data set and discuss our empirical results. In section 5,
we conclude and discuss the limitations of our testing strategy.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Model Setup
Let there be many workers and many firms. Workers live for N periods while firms
are infinitely lived. Workers maximize expected utility and firms maximize profits.
The discount factor is δ < 1.
Productivity Signals
Let ηi be a worker’s productivity and Xi be the set of characteristics that employers
can observe when the worker enters into the labor market. Let η0i = E(ηi|Xi) be the
initial expectation of the worker’s productivity based on observable characteristics,
and ei = ηi − η0i be the difference between a worker’s real productivity and the
expectation. Assume the error term ei is normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ20.
In each period, the incumbent firm observes a signal sit = ηi+it of the employee’s
productivity. Assume that the noise term it is independent each period and normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2 .
For outside firms, we consider two hypotheses, the symmetric learning hypothesis
and the asymmetric learning hypothesis. Under the symmetric learning hypothesis,
outside firms also observe sit, thus have exactly the same information as incumbent
firms. Under the asymmetric learning hypothesis, sit is observed by the incumbent
firm only.
The Labor Market
Let the labor market be competitive. When a new worker enters the labor market, all
firms make simultaneous wage offers based on (ηi|Xi), the worker’s believed produc-
tivity ηi given Xi. The worker always chooses the firm with the highest wage offer.
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When there is a tie, he picks randomly from firms with highest wage offers.
At the end of each period, an employed worker has the option to switch to an-
other firm. Under the asymmetric hypothesis, outside firms make offers according
to (ηi|Xi, H ti ), where H ti is the worker’s employment history. Under the symmetric
learning hypothesis, outside firms also take into accoun the productivity signals Sti
and make offers according to (ηi|Xi, H ti , Sti ). The incumbent firm then makes the
continuation wage offer based on the worker’s best outside wage offer woit and the
firm’s belief (ηi|Xi, H ti , Sti ) about the worker’s productivity.
Before the worker decides whether to switch, he privately observes a random
switching cost θit ∼ G(·). Let PV denote the expected present value of the worker’s
future income stream. The worker makes the switch if PV switchit − PV stayit > θit.
3.2.2 Model Analysis
Learning Update of Employers
The Symmetric Learning Case Under the symmetric learning hypothesis, out-
side firms observe the productivity signals and have the same information as the
incumbent firm. The process of employers’ learning about a worker’s ability is thus
the same for all employers.
Given the normally distributed error term ei and the signal noise term it, the
learning update of a worker’s productivity follows the normal update rule. Let ti be
the period at which worker i enters the labor market. Let h0 =
1
σ20
and h =
1
σ2
, the
updating process is:
ηiti = η
0
i , hti =
1
σ20
;
ηit =
ht−1ηi,t−1 + hsit
ht
, ht = ht−1 + h ∀t > ti1. (3.2.1)
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At the end of each period, employers update the worker’s expected productivity
according to new signal sit. The updated conditional distribution of the worker’s
productivity is still normally distributed, with the mean ηit and variance 1/ht.
Lemma 12. Under the symmetric learning hypothesis, taking Xi, H
t
i , S
t
i as given, a
worker’s updated productivity distribution (ηi|Xi, H ti , Sti ) is normally distributed with
N(ηit, ht), where ηit and ht are given by 3.2.1.
The Asymmetric Learning Case Under the asymmetric learning hypothesis,
outside firms no longer have the same information as the incumbent firm. The process
of employers’ learning about a worker’s ability is now dependent on the worker’s
working history H ti .
At period t, for a worker who has never switched firms since he entered the labor
market, his current employer has complete information on all the productivity signals
Sti . It is easy to see that, in this case, the employer’s learning update about the
worker’s productivity is exactly the same as the normal updating process 3.2.1 under
the symmetric case.
However, if a worker has ever switched firms, his current employer does not observe
the complete history of Sti . Let ts be the period when the worker switches to his
current firm. The firm now makes expectations about the worker’s productivity based
on his working history H ti and partial signals after switch S
ts,t
i .
Due to information asymmetry and adverse selection upon switching, the believed
distribution of ηi, conditional on a history with switches is no longer normal. The
learning update by the worker’s second and later firms thus no longer follows the
normal updating rule.
Although the distribution of (ηi|H ti , Sts,ti ) is complex and dependent on the equi-
librium wages, the belief updating still satisfies some tractable properties. Intuitively,
even though the starting conditional distribution of ηi is no longer normal, higher later
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signals still suggest that the worker is more likely to be of higher ηi. This intuition is
formally established in the following Lemma.
Lemma 13. Under the asymmetric learning hypothesis, consider a worker with work-
ing history H ti and partially observed productivity signals S
ts,t
i . Then, for any t > ts,
if sit > s
′
it, the conditional distribution D(ηi|H ti , Sts,t−1i , sit) first order stochastic dom-
inate D(ηi|H ti , Sts,t−1i , s′it).
Wage Determination and Model Implications
The Symmetric Learning Case Let yit denote output and PRit denote the
present value of the profit that the incumbent firm expects to earn from an employed
worker. Given the outside wage offer woit, the incumbent firm chooses wit to maximize:
Pr(stay)(E(yit|ηi,t−1, ht−1)− wit + δE(PRit+1|ηi,t−1, ht−1)). (3.2.2)
Note that, under the symmetric learning case, an outside firm becomes an incum-
bent firm one period after a worker’s switching. And since the learning update is the
same whether the worker makes the switch or not, we know that PV switchi,t+1 = PV
stay
i,t+1.
Therefore, it is easy to see that:
Pr(stay) = 1−G(PV switchit − PV stayit ) = 1−G(woit − wit). (3.2.3)
.
Also, since outside firms make competitive offers, we know:
woit = E(yit|ηi,t−1, ht−1) + δE(PRit+1|ηi,t−1, ht−1). (3.2.4)
Combining 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 with 3.2.2, we can simplify the maximization problem
as:
(1−G(woit − wit))(woit − wit). (3.2.5)
56
Let d be the solution to G(d) + g(d)d = 1. The wage process under symmetric
learning are then:
woit = E(yit|ηi,t−1, ht−1) + δd,
wit = E(yit|ηi,t−1, ht−1)− (1− δ)d ∀t < ti +N ;
woit = E(yit|ηi,t−1, ht−1)
wit = E(yit|ηi,t−1, ht−1)− d ∀t = ti +N.
Now that we have the expression for wages, we can derive the theoretical prediction
of wage patterns under symmetric learning.
Proposition 14. Under the symmetric learning hypothesis, if yit is increasing in
ηi, a worker’s next period wage conditional on his current wage and experience is
independent of his past wages. In particular, we have
Pr(wi,t+1|wi,t, t, wi,t′) = Pr(wi,t+1|wi,t, t) ∀t′ < t.
Proposition 14 states that, with symmetric learning, a worker’s current wage and
experience is sufficient statistics for the prediction of his next period wage. Condi-
tional on current wage and experience, workers’ past wages have no additional effect
on future wages, as any effect of past wages would have been taken into account in
the current wage.
The Asymmetric Learning Case In the symmetric learning case, the deriva-
tion of the wages is greatly simplified, as the probability of a worker staying (1 −
G(PV switchit − PV stayit )) can be reduced to 1−G(woit − wit) and is independent of the
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worker’s employment and performance history. The simplification is possible because,
one period after a switch, a worker’s new employer becomes an incumbent and the
wage setting and information of this new incumbent would be exactly the same as if
the worker has not switched.
Under asymmetric learning, this is no longer the case. One period after a worker’s
switch, due to asymmetric learning, the expected future payoff from the new firm
would not be the same as if he had stayed with his old employer. What’s more,
a worker’s expectation of the future payoffs depends not only on his employment
history, but also on his own assessment of his productivity ηi and his expectation of
firm’s wage functions. As a result of the complexity, it is impossible to derive a closed
form expression of wages under the asymmetric learning case.
However, with the properties of the learning update as stated in Lemma 13, we can
still derive implications of wage patterns under some weak assumptions on equilibrium
wages.
Definition 15. Let Dit be the conditional distribution of ηi in period t given all the
observable information to worker i’s current employer. We say that the wage function
w is increasing in Dit if w(H
t
i , Dit) ≥ w(H ti , D′it) whenever Dit first order stochastic
dominate D
′
it.
Consider a worker who switched firms in period ts and stayed in the same firm in
period ts + 1. Let ts′ be the period when the worker started working for his previous
firm.
Proposition 16. Under the asymmetric learning hypothesis, if the equilibrium wage
is increasing in Dit, then E(wi,ts+1|wi,ts , H tsi , wi,t′) is increasing in wi,t′ for all ts′ <
t′ < ts.
Proposition 16 states that, under asymmetric learning, a worker’s future wage
conditional on current wage and employment history is no longer independent of
past wages, as in the symmetric case. In particular, past wage information with the
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worker’s previous employers is not available to the current employer and is not taken
into account in the switching wage offer. Furthermore, given what we’ve established
in Lemma 13, and the assumption that wages are increasing in the employer’s belief
as defined in Definition 15, we can show that the expected future wage after switch,
conditional on current wage and employment history, is increasing from past wages.
Robustness of the Model Prediction
In the previous subsection, we’ve shown in Proposition 14 and Proposition 16 that,
conditional on current wage and employment history, past wage is independent of
future wage changes in the symmetric case, but not in the asymmetric case.
Intuitively, the prediction that past wages positively predict future wages in the
asymmetric learning case is easy to understand. Under asymmetric learning, past
wages contain information that reveals the employee’s ability, but is not taken into
account by the current employer. Even if we relax the asymmetric learning assump-
tions to allow outside firms to also observe partial performance signals, as long as
outside firms are not as well informed as inside firms, and wages contain information
not available to outside firms, the model prediction remains unaffected.
Given the intuitive robustness of the prediction under the asymmetric hypothesis,
if the data shows zero correlation between past wage and future wage conditional on
current wages, we could be relatively confident that there is no significant asymmetric
learning happening, at least to the point that revealing wage histories would have no
significant effect on wage settings.
On the other hand, the prediction that future wages should be independent of past
wages conditional on current wage and experience with symmetric learning seems
more subtle. In particular, it is not intuitively clear whether this prediction will
remain robust under situations beyond the setting of our model. To make sure we
could correctly interpret the empirical result in the case when the data shows signifi-
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cant positive correlation between past and future wages conditional on current wages,
we shall now consider some common alternative assumptions and their effect on our
model prediction under symmetric learning.
Human Capital Accumulation Throughout our previous analysis, we have not
explicitly specified the term of human capital accumulation. In our previous model
setting, the productivity term ηi is chosen by nature at period 0 and fixed throughout
the worker’s life. In real life, as workers acquire human capital, their productivity is
likely increasing with experience. Next, we shall show that, as long as there exists a
single variable, such as ability, which determines both the starting productivity and
the speed of learning, the result in Proposition 14 would still hold.
Let ai be the worker’s ability, which is chosen by nature at period 0 and fixed
throughout the worker’s life. Let both the starting productivity and the speed of
learning be determined by ai. Then the productivity function can be expressed as
ηi(t) = f(t)ai, where f(t) is a function of t that describes the learning curve of
workers. With this setting, our previous model without human capital accumulation
is just a special case when f(t) is constant.
Let the employer’s information structure be the same as before; i.e., the firm still
receives signals sit = ηi(t)+it on the worker’s productivity each period. Since ηi(t) is
basically a function of ai, the employer’s learning process is similar to before, except
that now, the learning happens over ai rather than over ηi. The learning update over
ai is still normal as before. The only difference now is that later signals will receive
higher weight compared to early signals if we assume it is still distributed with the
same variance it in each period. Then, with the normal updating, we would still
have the result that, the state of the learning can be summarized by the current state
mean ait and experience t. And since wages are set according to the employer’s belief
on ηi(t), which is essentially determined by ait, the result in Proposition 14 would
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still hold after including the term of human capital accumulation.
Alternative Wage-Setting Mechanisms In our previous analysis, we’ve as-
sumed that firms set wages to maximize expected profit under a moving mechanism
with a random per period moving cost of θit. With this specification, we were able
to derive functional forms of the wage function under the symmetric learning case.
Now, we shall show that our model prediction in Proposition 14 does not depend on
these details of the model and is robust with a wide range of alternative wage-setting
mechanism.
In particular, suppose the wages are set according to wage bargaining between the
employer and employees instead of by wage posting. Let the bargaining power of the
employee be β and the reservation wage be R. The employee’s wage under the simple
Nash bargaining would be wit = βE(yit|ηi,t−1, ht−1) + (1− β)R. It is easy to see from
the functional form that the result of Proposition 14 still holds. Moreover, the result
of Proposition 14 does not even require any specific form of the wage function. As
long as wit is strictly increasing in E(yit|ηi,t−1, ht−1), combined with the properties of
the learning, the independence of future wages from past wages conditional on current
wage and experience still holds.
3.3 Empirical Implementation
With our model predictions specified in the previous section, we shall now move on
to the strategy of empirical implementation.
Let t be the period when a worker has just switched to a new firm. Let Xi be
the set of observable characteristics when the worker enters the market and Zit be
the set of characteristics that is observable and is changing with time, such as the
worker’s employment history. Expressing the wage function in terms of current wage
and other observable characteristics, we have:
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wi,t+1 = β0 + β1wi,t + β2Zi,t+1 + β3Xi + ui,t+1. (3.3.1)
.
Given our result in Proposition 14, the residual term ui,t+1 in 3.3.1 should be
independent with wi,t−1 if learning is symmetric and positively correlated with wi,t−1
if learning is asymmetric.
If we, the cliometricians can observe the complete set of Xi as the employers
observe, our testing strategy would simply involve running the regression as in 3.3.1
and then running a second stage regression of ui,t+1 on wi,t−1 and testing whether the
coefficient on wi,t−1 is positive.
However, due to limitation of the data, it is unlikely that the characteristics in-
cluded in the data cover the full set of Xi. Let X1i be the set of characteristics in Xi
that can be observed in the data and X2i be those that we cannot observe; the wage
expression is now:
wi,t+1 = β0 + β1wi,t + β2Zi,t+1 + β3X1i + β4X2i + ui,t+1. (3.3.2)
Since we can not observe X2i, running the regression with only what we can
observe will give biased estimates, and more importantly, X2i will still show up in
the estimated residual uˆi,t+1. Since X2i also determines wi,t−1, our prediction will fail
as there would always be a positive correlation between uˆi,t+1 and wi,t−1. To resolve
this problem, in our second stage testing, we use (wi,t−1 − wi,t−2) instead of wi,t−1 to
cancel out the X2i term.
Therefore, our testing strategy is as follows. In the first step, we estimate:
wi,t+1 = βˆ0 + βˆ1wi,t + βˆ2Zi,t+1 + βˆ2X1i + uˆi,t+1. (3.3.3)
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In the second step, we estimate:
uˆi,t+1 = γˆ0 + γˆ1(wi,t−1 − wi,t−2) + µ. (3.3.4)
Here, uˆit measures how much wi,t+1 is higher than expected given wi,t and other
observable characteristics, and (wi,t−1 − wi,t−2) is the wage increase in period t − 1,
when the employee is still working for the previous employer. If learning is symmetric,
since the information on an employee’s productivity associated with the previous
wage increase is already known to the current employer and shown in wi,t, whether
the employee performs out of expectation in the next period should be independent
of past wage increase. Therefore, we would expect γˆ1 = 0. On the other hand, if
learning is asymmetric, higher past wage increase reveals positive information about
the employee’s productivity that has not been taken into account in wi,t, and we
would expect γˆ1 > 0.
3.4 Empirical Test
3.4.1 Description of Data and Variables
In this section, we shall implement our testing strategy using the National Longitu-
dinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97), which traces information from the same set
of individuals from 1997 to 2011. The advantage of using the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth is that it contains information on individuals’ early careers when
learning is the most important. Previous tests of learning by Farber and Gibbons
(1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001) and Schonberg (2007) use the early NLSY79 version
of the same survey.
Since our test is about employers’ learning, we include only observations when the
individual is working at a regular employee job. We consider a period as one year and
take an individual’s wage at the first job during year t as wit. To avoid the result being
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driven by outliers, we exclude the observation if wage is lower than 1 or higher than
6000. Our two-step test requires the observation of wages during four consecutive
periods wt−2, wt−1, wt and wt+1, and that the worker is working for one firm in period
t and t + 1 and a different firm in period t − 2 and t − 1. Without considering
the possible missing values in other control variables, the number of observations
satisfying the above requirement is 4898. The average wage in this sample is 1317
with a standard deviation of 761.
For control variables, we include basic employment information on experience,
tenure and tenure at the previous job, all of which are measured in weeks. We also
include firm-specific information on industry, occupation and firm size. Individual
characteristics include education, age, sex and race. Education is given in seven
different levels of degrees. The summary statistics of key variables are shown below
in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of key variables.
3.4.2 Empirical Results
With the data from NLSY97, we implement our test with the two-step empirical
strategy discussed in the previous section. The result of the test is shown in Table
3.1. The first stage regression predicts future wage based on current wage and other
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observable characteristics. In specification (1), we included experience, tenure at
current job, tenure at previous job, education, age, sex, race and year dummies.
In specification (2), we included additional control of firm-specific characteristics,
including employer size, industry and occupation.
The results are similar across specifications. In both specifications, in the first
stage regression, the parameter on current wage, experience, education and age are
significantly positive. The parameter on being female is significantly negative. Under
both specifications, the parameters on tenure and tenure at previous job are small
and insignificant. From specification (1) to specification (2), the magnitude of all
significant parameters decreases. This is consistent with the inclusion of additional
controls, which are likely correlated with those previous controls because of sorting.
Our key parameter of concern, the estimated parameter on past wage increase
in the second stage regression, is very close to zero and insignificant in both spec-
ifications. In specification (1), the estimated parameter is 0.0141 with a standard
error of 0.0167. In specification (2), the estimated parameter is further reduced to
0.00681 and the standard error is 0.0138. Since the estimates are close to zero and
insignificant, our result is consistent with the prediction under the symmetric learning
hypothesis and shows no support of asymmetric learning.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new method of testing asymmetric learning using wage
data. This method takes advantage of the fact that employers adjust wages according
to their learning and updated belief about an employee’s productivity. Thus, past
wage changes reveal information about an employee’s performance, which are not
observed by later employers under the asymmetric learning hypothesis. On the other
hand, if the learning is symmetric, any information revealed by past wages should
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have already been observed by current employers. With the difference between the two
learning hypotheses, we are able to test asymmetric learning based on whether past
wages positively predict future wage conditional on current wage and other observable
characteristics. With NLSY97, we find the data is consistent with symmetric rather
than asymmetric learning.
The key advantage of our model is that our testing strategy requires only the
observation of wages and employment histories, making it possible for our test to
be used with an administrative data set. The advantage of an administrative data
set is that it is usually much larger and very precise; thus, we would have very
accurate testing results. The disadvantage of our model is, as we use wage patterns for
prediction, we require four consecutive observations of wages and require a particular
employment pattern across the four periods. If our method is used with survey data
sets, our sample size can be greatly reduced by missing value problems. Combined
with the rough recordings of wage information in survey data sets, the accuracy of the
test can be greatly reduced. Given the advantages and disadvantages of our testing
method, it would be ideal to use our testing method with administrative rather than
survey data, and we hope to be able to implement our test on administrative data in
the future.
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Table 3.2: Results of the two stage OLS regression
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